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effective through forces that they themselves do not control. Moral and spiritual ideals as set forth in the Christian philosophy of life are essential to the maintenance of our democratic institutions. Dr. Hadley's volume does much to set forth this great truth at a time when renewed understanding of it is imperative.

WILLIAM J. KERBY, PH. D.

The American Army in the European Conflict, translated from the French by the authors, Colonel De Chambrun and Captain De Marenches. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919.

Although the mass of books and pamphlets treating of the World War and the subsequent efforts at peace and reconstruction is even now grown to unwieldy proportions, we should, nevertheless, as Lord Northcliff very properly says, "welcome all well-informed contributions to its literature." The book of De Chambrun and De Marenches is, no doubt, well-informed on the special phase of the war under treatment, namely, the participation of America in the great struggle. Who the authors are does not appear from the book itself, as it lacks the usual preface or foreword, but we are informed by the publishers that they were attached to General Pershing's staff. Yet they write as Frenchmen, and their judgment therefore appears as doubly valuable, being based upon first-hand information by foreign observers.

The book does full justice to the genius of our Commander-in-Chief and to the impetuous valor and patient endurance of our soldier boys, so often treated with but slight regard by official British reports and unofficial slurs and slanders. The authors always try to be fair in their statements and conclusions. The American soldier had no training for the conflict worth speaking of, save the general training of American manhood in bravery, genial forbearance, and a quick sense of the requirements of the hour; but these qualities, which form the very essence of a true soldier, were quickly developed by actual warfare into an army the like of which the world has never seen. All this is brought out in glowing colors in the work before us. As a matter of course, there is the usual amount of dry statistics on the composition of the armies under General Pershing, and also the summary description of the various American benevolent associations employed

as auxiliaries in the war, as the Red Cross, the Y. M. C. A., Knights of Columbus, and others. The Red Cross and Y. M. C. A. receive a disproportionate treatment as compared with that given to the Knights of Columbus. But this is a matter of minor importance and can be easily rectified in a second edition. On the great question as to America's share in winning the war, the authors have this to say: "The armistice found General Pershing at the head of an army more than 2,000,000 strong. In the course of 1919 this force would have been doubled. Both in France and America every provision was made to attain this result; the powerful mechanism which had been set on foot in view of mobilization was running without a hitch. Transports and reception camps in Europe were kept up to their full capacity. Nothing, not even the German submarine, was now able to seriously impede the regular movement of reinforcements. Undoubtedly the knowledge of this situation had its influence on the enemies' decision to abandon the struggle, so that America would not pursue her efforts to a finish even more disastrous to Germany. The 2,000,000 soldiers already in Europe sufficed to determine the victory. Thanks to American aid, the enemy had been forced, first to stabilize, then to defensive warfare, followed by a more and more precipitate retreat, and, finally, on the 11th of November to a capitulation" (p. 388).

This final judgment of the authors on America's share in winning the war takes no notice of the warlike qualities of our soldiers as one of the chief elements of success. On this matter I will quote the deliberate judgment of a fair-minded Englishman, Sir F. Maurice: "I doubt if, even after the second battle of the Marne, there was a single Allied general who believed that it would be possible for a great American army to force its way triumphantly through the German lines. Many of the American divisions which fought in those last battles which brought us victory went into action with little or no experience of trenches, and with none at all of the hell on earth which constituted a modern battle. The multiplicity of weapons and the complication of tactics which four years of war had produced, and the fact that an entirely new element had entered into war with the development of aircraft, all made the effective handling of troops in battle a far more difficult problem than it had ever been. Neither the American gen-

erals nor the American staffs had had experience in fitting together the numerous parts of the military machine or in handling large bodies of troops. For all these reasons a great attack by American troops against intact German defenses on the most difficult part of the front was a bold experiment. It was one thing to obliterate the St. Mihiel salient in thirty hours, to stop the German rush at the Marne, or even to drive the Germans from the Marne to the Vesle in cooperation with Allied troops. It was quite another matter to fight continuously on a front of some twenty miles for close on fifty days, through line after line of German trenches, in a battle which entailed the employment of nearly three-quarters of a million American troops. It was done because America placed the pick of her splendid manhood in the field, and that manhood went ahead at the job in front of it without counting the cost. *By doing its job it gave us victory in 1918.*" (Sir. F. Maurice, *The Last Four Months*, pp. 241-242.)

With these few exceptions we can recommend the book to our readers as one of the permanent contributions to our war library, expressing our hope, at the same time, that the guardians of public opinion will allow no one to impair or belittle the only thing of value which we have gained in the conflict—the imperishable renown our soldier boys won in the battlefields of France.

J. E. ROTHENSTEINER.

A History of the Pacific Northwest, New Edition. By Joseph Schafer, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918.

Within the limits of a handbook Professor Schafer presents in a vivid and well-balanced narrative the story of the Oregon Country from the earliest European explorations along the North Pacific Coast to the present day. The book, which was first issued in 1905, has been "revised and rewritten" and chapters have been added on the Progress of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, and Social and Political Change. Since the first edition of his book was brought out the author has had opportunity to make special studies in England, both of governmental and private material, bearing on the diplomatic phases of the Oregon boundary dispute between the United States and Great Britain and the fruit